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Abstract 
 
The development of web technology has led to the 
emergence of web aggregation, a service that collects 
existing web data and turns them into more useful 
information.  We review the development of both 
comparison and relationship aggregation and discuss their 
impacts on various stakeholders.   
 
The aggregator’s capability of transparently extracting web 
data has raised challenging issues in database and privacy 
protection.  Consequently, new regulations are introduced or 
being proposed.  We analyze the interactions between 
aggregation and related policies and provide our insights 
about the implications of new policies on the development of 
web aggregation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The development of Information Technology (IT) and the 
Internet over the past decade has brought sweeping social 
and economic changes to our society.  Conversely, new 
regulations in response to emerging IT enabled services have 
great impact on their effectiveness and evolution.  We will 
examine the interplay between IT and policy using the 
example of web aggregation. 
 
The web has dual effects on the dissemination of 
information.  It allows information creators to directly reach 
vast end users, eliminating the intermediaries necessary in 
traditional media. Meanwhile, since no single information 
creator can meet all the information needs of a user and there 
are over 40 million potentially useful sources in the U.S. 
alone1, there is a need for intermediaries to bring 
information from various sources to end users. This latter 
effect has been the major motivation for the emergence and 
the development of web aggregation. 
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 Number of Internet hosts in 1999 according to World Bank online data. 
Web aggregation is a service that transparently collects 
information from multiple web sources and performs useful 
analysis to add value to the integrated information [1].  
Shopbots, such as DealTime.com and Kelkoo.com, are 
examples of comparison aggregation, which allow users to 
compare prices and other attributes of products offered by 
multiple vendors.  Relationship aggregation allows users to 
manage multiple relationships using a single logon.  For 
example, Citigroup’s myciti.com allows users to view all 
their online relationship accounts in one place.  We will 
discuss in detail the evolution and impact of both 
comparison and relationship aggregation in section 2. 
 
Since aggregation service involves multiple information 
creators, and especially relationship aggregation deals with 
personal information, complicated policy issues arise.  Most 
of the issues hinge upon the tradeoff between the free flow 
of information and the protection of intellectual property and 
consumer privacy.  In section 3 we will discuss these issues 
and analyze how emerging policies may affect the 
development of information aggregation.  Section 4 
concludes our discussion. 
 
2. Evolution and Impact of Web Aggregation 
 
The development of web aggregation can have great impact 
on markets and society.  In this section, we will discuss the 
evolution and analyze the impact of comparison and 
relationship aggregation. 
 
2.1 Comparison Aggregation 
 
Finding the best offers from thousands of e-stores is not an 
easy task even with the help of a generic search engine.  
Comparison aggregators, which collect product offering 
information by crawling e-store sites and organize the 
collected information for easy retrieval and comparison, 
have emerged as a helpful intermediary between retailers 
and consumers.  DealTime, mySimon, and bizRate are 
among the most common comparison aggregators in the 
U.S.  Table 1 compares them with information found at their 
websites.  They have similar features and often have overlap 
in vendor coverage.   
 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Three Comparison Aggregators 
 
 MySimon DealTime bizRate 
URL www.mySimon.com www.dealtime.com www.bizrate.com 
International 
Presence 
U.S., France, 
Germany 
U.S., U.K. U.S. only 
Scope 1) 2,000 online 
stores and 32,000 
offline services; 
2) 250 product 
categories; 
3) 130 paying 
merchants 
1) 4,000 online 
stores; 
2) 26 major 
categories; 
3) 360 paying 
merchants 
1) 1,400 sellers; 
2) 19 categories 
Listing 
Requirement 
1) Free;  
2) Merchants over 
3,000 monthly leads 
are required to pay a 
fee and receive 
brand recognition 
1) Free; 
2) Merchant can pay 
a fee for brand 
recognition 
1) Free; 
2) Merchant can 
pay a fee for 
premium 
placement 
Merchant 
Rating 
Gomez Gomez bizRate 
Personali-
zation 
1) Calendar and 
links to gift 
searches; 
2) Saved searches; 
Newsletter 
1) Shopping 
advisory; 
2) Saved searches; 
3) Newsletter 
1) Timesaving 
features (auto form 
filling, etc.); 
2) Exclusive deals; 
3) Newsletter  
Revenue 
Model 
1) Advertising; 
2) Fee based listing; 
3) Consulting 
(search technology) 
1) Advertising; 
2) Fee based listing; 
3) Consulting 
(search technology) 
1) Advertising; 
2) Fee based 
listing; 
3) Consulting 
(market and 
consumer analysis)
 
There are many other comparison aggregators in the U.S., 
e.g., eShop.com (now part of Microsoft’s MSN), 
PriceGrabber.com, and Clickthebutton.com.  Some of the 
specialized compassion aggregators have been expanding 
their aggregation categories.  For example, PriceScan, an 
aggregator focused on computer and electronics, has 
included books, sporting goods, and home & garden into its 
aggregation offering.   
 
Table 2. Costs and Benefits of Comparison Aggregation 
 
Stakeholders Benefits Costs/Risks 
Consumers • Convenience and lower 
search cost 
• Lower price 
• Better service 
• Possibility to be price 
discriminated 
• Minor risk of losing 
autonomy privacy  
Vendors • Access to vast consumers 
• Knowledge of 
competitors 
• Dynamic pricing 
• Increased competition 
• Less visiting time 
• Weakening customer 
relationship 
• Data could be used by 
competitors 
Manufacturers Effective targeted 
marketing channel 
 
Aggregators • Establishment as 
intermediary 
• Multiple revenue streams 
• Profitability 
• Potential impact of database 
protection policy 
 
The impact of comparison aggregation on stakeholders is 
summarized in Table 2.  Comparison aggregation offers 
many benefits to consumers.  It significantly reduces the 
search cost in online shopping.  This results in increased 
product variety and lower prices online.  In addition, 
empirical research reveals that not all consumers buy from 
the vendors that offer the lowest price [2, 3].  The overall 
service quality, e.g., on time delivery, flexibly return policy 
and friendly customer services, also can significantly affect 
consumer’s purchasing decisions.  Comparison of these 
characteristics by aggregators results in increased 
competition beyond price.  Consequently, consumers are 
able to enjoy improved service from online vendors.  These 
benefits, measured in consumer surplus, are estimated to be 
nearly $1 billion in book market [4] and over $6 billion in 
consumer electronics market [5] in the U.S. Although 
consumers may have the risk of exposing their consumption 
pattern to aggregators, this information is often studied 
collectively without involving any personal data.  
Consumers may also have a potential risk of being intruded 
by aggressive targeted marketing campaigns that violate 
consumers’ autonomy privacy.  
 
Through the service of comparison aggregators, vendors 
have immediate access to vast potential customers.  Small 
but niche market players can gain consumer awareness 
through the listing service of aggregators.  In addition, 
comparison aggregation is also a great tool for a vendor to 
learn its competitors and design competitive offering 
strategies, e.g., dynamic pricing.  For example, 
Booksamillion.com allows one to compare its price with a 
number of other online booksellers and dynamically offer a 
competitive price.  Overall, vendors are facing a higher level 
of competition.  Consumers may spend less time visiting 
their sites, potentially reducing the opportunities of 
spontaneous selling and weakening the relationship with 
their customers.  The entire databases about various 
products, part of the valuable assets possessed by the online 
vendors, are now being freely data-mined by aggregators 
and can potentially be used by competitors.   
 
Comparison aggregation is also an effective targeted 
marketing channel.  Manufactures and vendors can deliver 
their messages to customers who are looking for specific 
products. 
 
Finally, aggregators are becoming more proficient in 
intermediation by accumulating knowledge about vendors 
and consumers.  They are enjoying multiple revenue streams 
while expanding their service coverage in terms of product 
categories and geographical areas.  But aggregators are still 
fairly new entities in the electronic marketplace.  They are 
still experimenting to become a viable business.  Critical to 
their success is their capability of collecting enough vendor 
data to offer unbiased and relatively complete comparison 
information.  This contingency will be affected if access to 
vendor data becomes more difficult or costly due to possible 
future policy changes that advocate online database 
protection. 
 
2.2 Relationship Aggregation 
 
Using “screen scraping” technology, an aggregator can 
extract account information from different websites on 
behalf of its customers even without the cooperation of the 
website owners.  Financial institutions initially viewed 
aggregators as a threat to their operations and tried to block 
the access by aggregators; First Union National Bank filed a 
lawsuit in 1999 against PayTrust, an early online bill 
payment aggregator.  Later First Union withdrew litigation 
and published a set of guidelines for aggregators to follow.  
By late 2001, over 100 financial institutions, including First 
Union, and a few web portals are offering account 
aggregation services.  Financial institutions have changed 
their view to see aggregation as a necessary online banking 
service and a tool that provides many other benefits, e.g., 
increased customer loyalty, opportunity for cross selling, and 
possibility to provide value-added/cost-reducing services 
such as online bill presentment and payment.   
 
Table 3. Evolution of Relationship Aggregation  
 
  Three Years Ago Today (2002) Future 
Scope Single category, 
e.g., financial or 
rewards 
Multiple 
categories  
A focal point for all 
personal information 
needs 
Usage Emergent 1-2 million users Steadily increasing  
Stakeholder 
Dynamics 
1) Aggregators 
emerged as a new 
entity with 
aggregation 
technology 
2) Aggregatees 
viewed 
aggregators as a 
threat 
1) Aggregatees 
see aggregation as 
a necessity and an 
opportunity 
2) Aggregatees 
become 
aggregators 
3) Some early 
aggregators 
become 
technology 
providers  
1) Users will include 
professionals who 
provide financial 
planning, 
management, and 
advisory services 
2) Billers and 
electronic payment 
enablers will 
participate 
aggregation  
 
Capability Reporting tool that 
provides 
consolidated view 
and convenience 
of auto login to 
other sites 
1) Limited fund 
transfer and bill 
payment 
capability 
2) Limited 
availability on 
mobile devices 
1) Full fledged 
financial 
management 
2) Integration with 
comparison and other 
aggregation services  
3) Accessible from 
any network device 
Technology Screen scraping Screen scraping 
and limited direct 
feed using 
industry standards 
Standard based 
secure information 
sharing 
 
Table 3 summarizes some of the changes and the trend in 
relationship aggregation.  The capability of fund transfer 
across organizational boundaries and electronic bill 
presentment and payment (EBPP) are among the most 
wanted features of online banking [6].  With the capability 
of accessing all financial accounts, aggregators are well 
positioned to provide these services.  One of the biggest 
benefits of these services is cost savings for both billers and 
consumers.  For billers, the transaction cost can be reduced 
from over $1 to 2 or 3 cents per bill2.  Consumers can also 
save by eliminating check writing, mailing, and late fees.  
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 From information presented at the American Bankers’ 2nd Annual Account 
Aggregation Conference, April 23-24, 2001, Virginia, U.S.A. 
3. Policy Issues of Web Aggregation 
 
Aggregators collect and reuse information that resides in the 
public domain or in proprietary systems.  Relationship 
aggregators also deal with vast personal information of 
individual consumers.  Their increasing capabilities and 
widespread adoption have created concerns about the 
balance between effective use of information and adequate 
protection of information providers and consumer privacy.  
Some unique issues, such as trespassing in cyberspace, have 
also been brought up in a number of lawsuits against 
aggregators and require attention because they are not 
particularly addressed by existing regulations.  We will 
discuss these issues, new policy initiatives, and their 
implications to the development of information aggregation. 
 
3.1 Database Protection 
 
An aggregator obtains its data from hundreds of thousands 
of information sources, each containing factual data, such as 
product prices or daily balances.  In legal terms these 
sources have been called collections of information and 
databases interchangeably.  These databases often take 
substantial efforts to create and maintain.  Therefore 
database owners have great incentives in protecting their 
investment.   
 
There are several possible legal mechanisms for 
conventional database protection, such as trade secrets, 
contract law, and copyright [7, 8].  But on the Internet, many 
databases are made available to the general public for free 
access, eliminating the possibility of trade secret protection.  
Although some database owners have managed to negotiate 
licensing agreements with their users, it is costly and 
sometimes impossible to enforce those contracts.   
 
As to copyright protection, the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 
and its subsequent amendments are to protect “original 
works of authorship”.  Databases, a form of compilation or 
derivative works of non-copyrightable facts, are only 
protected to the extent of the creative selection and 
arrangement of the data.  Therefore, in the current copyright 
protection framework, it is the “originality”, not the effort, 
that is protected.  This principle has been clearly 
demonstrated in the landmark Supreme Court ruling of Feist 
Publications vs. Rural Telephone Co. in 1991.  Feist, a 
phone directory publisher, copied Rural’s white page listings 
that had fewer than 8,000 records organized alphabetically 
by last name.  The district court applied the “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine and granted Rural summary judgment to 
reward its effort in compiling the listings.  But the Supreme 
Court rejected the doctrine on the basis of the originality 
requirement of copyright.  Rural’s white pages do not show 
any originality because the selection and arrangement of the 
listings are entirely obvious.  
 
In a similar vein, courts rejected copyright infringement 
claims found in a number of recent cases against 
aggregators, such as eBay vs. Bidder’s Edge, Ticketmaster 
vs. Tickets.com, and mySimon vs. Priceman.  In fact, 
aggregators often organize the extracted information and 
express it in their own ways, predefined or configured by 
end users.  Copyright infringement can hardly stand under 
this circumstance. 
 
The Internet has allowed access, duplication, and 
distribution of databases with little cost.  Database creators 
argue that without any effective protection their incentives 
of creating and maintaining those databases will diminish 
because of unfair competition from free riders.  The 
European Union first embraced the “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine and introduced Database Directive in 1996, 
mandating member nations to implement it by 1998.  This 
directive recognizes the need for protecting the investment 
of database owners by granting them a sui generis (Greek 
word meaning “of its own kind”) right.  In the U.K. 
implementation of the Directive, the Copyright and Rights in 
Databases Regulations 1997, this special right is called 
“database right” and is defined as a “property right …  in a 
database if there has been a substantial investment in 
obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the 
database”.  A recent case settled according to this regulation 
is British Horsing Board (BHB) vs. William Hill.  Betting 
service provider William Hill published on its own web site 
the lists of runners for forthcoming races compiled by BHB 
without its consent. On February 9, 2001, the High Court of 
the U.K. ruled that William Hill violated BHB’s database 
right on the accounts that BHB had invested significant 
amount of time and money in compiling, verifying, and 
presenting the data and the portions reported by William Hill 
were substantial with regard to the importance, not the 
amount, of the information to those interested in horse 
racing3. 
 
Although the “sweat of the brow” theory has been adopted 
throughout the E.U., it has not been successful in the U.S.  
Four bills have been introduced since 1996 in the U.S. and 
all failed to pass.  Pressed by the reciprocity provision in the 
E.U. Database Directive, U.S. attempted a similar bill in 
1996 (HR 3531, Moorhead).  After its failure, HR 2652 was 
introduced by Coble in 1997, which received strong 
opposition from a loose coalition of science groups, 
libraries, and the industries in telecom, ISPs, and valued-
added database producers [7].  Following the enactment of 
the E.U. Database Directive in 1998, two more controversial 
bills, HR 354 by Coble and HR 1858 by Bliley, were 
introduced in 1999 and no agreement was reached by the 
end of the last session of the Congress.  Internationally, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been 
considering an international treaty for database protection.  
As an initial supporter of such a treaty, U.S. quickly changed 
to an opposing position soon after the withdrawal of HR 
3531 in 1996 [7].  It will take tremendous debate and 
negotiations to form an acceptable framework for database 
protection worldwide.  The major issue is to arrive at an 
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 News release of BHB on February 9, 2001.  Full text can be found at 
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appropriate scope of protection without the risk of creating 
information monopolies and discouraging downstream 
innovations based on existing information.   
 
We speculate that the final legislation will have little impact 
on information aggregation because in most cases the “sweat 
of the brow” doctrine does not and should not apply to the 
underlying data extracted by web aggregators.  Product 
databases compiled by online vendors are to inform buyers 
and facilitate sales of products, not the data.  The 
compilation effort should be accounted as part of product 
selling activities.  The reuse of this data by aggregators is 
also to inform buyers and facilitate sales of products, which 
would enhance rather than corrode the initial investment of 
data compilation.  For financial account aggregation, some 
of the data is the result of user-initiated transactions (e.g., 
deposit, withdrawal, and fund transfer), which is effectively 
entered by the user, not the financial institution.  In addition, 
aggregation is performed with authorization from the user 
who arguably owns the information about himself.  The 
function of the database is very much like a security box in a 
bank (i.e., users put their personal information in a secure 
system), accessible by an authorized entity on user’s behalf.  
In both cases the effort of compiling databases does not 
constitute the core business of aggregatees.  This is 
fundamentally different from the BHB case, where the data 
is the business. 
 
Even if some of the aggregated data falls under the “sweat of 
the brow” doctrine, we speculate that the impact of the final 
legislation on information aggregation will be limited for the 
following reasons.  First, E.U. Database Directive has been 
regarded as the strictest regulation for database protection.  
Even so, aggregators have been successfully operating in 
most E.U. countries, e.g., Klkoo, PriceRunner, DealTime, 
mySimon, and CitiBank’s account aggregator.  Second, 
factual information, once aggregated, is hard to identify 
where it originally comes from.  Given the large quantity of 
factual information and huge number of sources involved in 
aggregation, enforcement is a big problem.  Third, as we 
have seen from preceding discussions, database creators 
such as small online vendors often gain incredible reach to 
potential customers through aggregators.  The interweaving 
interests in sharing and reusing information reduce, if not 
completely eliminate, the need for litigation.  Fourth, even 
database creators need to rely on other sources to compile 
their databases.  In this sense, there are few “pure” database 
creators.  For instance, a vendor compiles its product 
database using information from manufacturers.  And 
finally, consumers and providers want and need web 
aggregation evidenced by the compelling benefits discussed 
earlier.  These public interests should not be overlooked and 
regulations should put structure that guides the exploitation 
of the new opportunities of web aggregation. 
 
3.2 Trespassing in Cyberspace 
 
Database owners have used another controversial theory, 
“trespass to chattels”, to charge against online information 
aggregation activities.  For example, eBay claimed that 
80,000 to 100,000 daily requests from Bidder’s Edge 
constituted 1.53% total requests processed by eBay web 
servers.  The court issued a preliminary injunction to stop 
Bidder’s Edge from aggregating information from eBay 
based on the reasoning that significant harm could be caused 
if such activities are allowed.  However, in a similar case the 
court rejected Ticketmaster’s trespass claim against 
Tickets.com because “it is hard to see how entering a 
publicly available web site could be called a trespass, since 
all are invited to enter”4.   
 
Legal experts have strongly opposed the application of 
trespass theory to the Internet.  In a friend-of-the-court brief 
regarding the eBay vs. Bidder’s Edge case, 28 law 
professors pointed out that it is inappropriate to substitute 
possible future harm for the actual harm required by the law 
of trespass to chattels.  They concluded that he ruling 
threatens efficient information exchange on the Internet and 
the public interests demand a reversal in this case [9].  The 
case was settled outside of court in early 2001.  
 
Application of trespass theory to other areas of the Internet 
environment, such as unwanted email, has received similar 
oppositions because of its pernicious effects to the integrity 
of the global Internet system [10].   
 
The trespass theory will probably not be accepted within the 
Internet context.  Information aggregation should not trigger 
this as long as it does not abuse the Internet system (e.g., 
sending repeated unnecessary requests to cause a denial of 
service to web servers). 
 
3.3 Consumer Privacy Protection 
 
Easy access to information on the Internet has concerned 
people about their online privacy.  In the U.S., almost two-
thirds (63.6%) of Internet users and more than three-quarter 
(76.1%) of non-users believe that people what go online put 
their privacy at risk [11].  When it comes to financial data, 
almost all (94%) consumers are concerned about privacy and 
security [6].  For financial account related relationship 
aggregation, privacy and security concerns are the major 
barriers that prevent people from putting trust in the service.  
These issues have to be addressed with technical and 
regulatory measures to fully take advantage of information 
aggregation.   
 
Privacy protection is very complex in the U.S.  There are 
many privacy related regulations, each having its own 
context and addressing specific issues.  For financial related 
privacy protection there are Right to Financial Privacy Act, 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Federal Educational Rights and 
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Privacy Act, and the most recent Title V of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act (also known as Gram-Leach-
Bliley Act, or GLBA).  In addition to its diverse 
characteristics, U.S. privacy law is also highly decentralized 
(having both Federal and sometimes divergent State laws) 
and dynamically evolving [12].  Since no privacy law in the 
U.S. is specifically designed with the Internet in mind, it is a 
delicate issue in today’s network environment.  Recognizing 
the complexity, delicacy, and importance of privacy 
protection, over 100 U.S. corporations, such as IBM, 
American Express, and AT&T, have appointed their Chief 
Privacy Officers (CPOs) since 1998 to oversee privacy 
issues5. 
 
The GLBA is one of the recent regulations that are most 
closely related to information aggregation, especially 
financial account aggregation.  Title V of the Act is 
dedicated to financial privacy protection, demanding all 
financial institutions to inform their customers about their 
handling of nonpublic personal information at least once a 
year, and give their customers the opportunity to opt-out 
information sharing with nonaffiliated third parties.  For 
privacy protection purposes, the Act and its corresponding 
implementations define “financial institution” very widely to 
cover any company that is engaged in financial activities.  
For example, a financial software company is considered to 
be a “financial institution” for privacy protection purposes 
and if the company sells products or services to consumers, 
it has obligations to disclose its privacy practices and offer 
opt-out choices.  Clearly, financial account aggregators are 
“financial institutions”, subject to the privacy provisions in 
GLBA.  With this broad scope, many agencies are involved 
in the implementation and enforcement of the Act, these 
include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC).  These agencies are charged to consult one another to 
ensure consistencies of the guidelines across all 
jurisdictions.  Aggregators who are technology companies, 
such as Yodlee, fall under the jurisdiction of the FTC, which 
conducts enforcement by reacting to complaints and does 
not run routine compliance examinations as banking 
regulatory agencies normally do.  However, these companies 
will be strictly scrutinized under vendor management 
guidelines for traditional financial institutions.  
 
The reuse/redisclosure limits in the GLBA regulations 
provide that an aggregator may only use the aggregated 
information or disclose it to third parties necessary to 
perform aggregation service [13].  This may pose a 
limitation for possible cross-selling opportunities using the 
aggregate information.  On the other hand, if a consumer 
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fails to opt out of information sharing, an aggregator may be 
allowed to share aggregated information.  Between the 
limitations and opt-out choices, the regulations do not 
clearly state the legality of either one, leaving the delicate 
issue to aggregators’ own discretion. In order to avoid 
possible damages to reputation and loss of trust, even in the 
case where a customer does not opt out for information 
disclosure, an aggregator should be very careful not to 
intrude consumer privacy. 
 
Like database protection, privacy protection has its costs and 
benefits.  Without sufficient privacy protection, users will be 
reluctant to put their privacy at risk and sign up for 
aggregation services.  On the other hand, over protection 
will significantly increase administrative costs and result in 
high prices for financial products.  For example, 
implementation of Privacy Directive will cost EU member 
states $15-20 billion [14]; U.S. will incur $9-36 billion 
implementation cost to avoid “data embargo” of EU [15]. 
Section 507 of the GLBA allows states to offer greater 
privacy protection, which could take the form of an “opt-in” 
approach where consumers have full control of their 
personal records.  This is the exact approach taken by the 
E.U. in its Privacy Directive.  By today’s U.S. standard, 
“opt-in” is too strict and it is strongly opposed by the 
industries, especially the financial services industry.  The 
Financial Services Roundtable [16] surveyed 90 large banks, 
insurance and securities companies to estimate consumer 
benefits from information sharing among institutions.  They 
estimate that the consumers of the 90 institutions can save 
$17 billion and 320 million hours per year.  The sources of 
benefits of information sharing include money saved through 
outsourcing to third parties, relationship pricing and 
proactive offers; and time saved though call centers, Internet 
based services, third party services, proactive offers and pre-
filled applications.   
 
Similar to database protection, differences of privacy laws 
between the U.S. and the E.U. have been causing some 
problems.  The E.U. will cut off data flow to the U.S. 
because they deem that the privacy protection in the U.S. 
does not meet the minimum requirement of the E.U. Privacy 
Directive.  Some of the differences can be reconciled 
through the Safe Harbor Agreement negotiated by the 
Department of Commerce6.  Unfortunately, financial 
services are excluded from the agreement because they are 
not regulated by the Department of Commerce7.  In April 
2001, the E.U. rejected a U.S. request for postponing the 
approval of a model contract that financial institutions are 
asked to sign before sending data to non-E.U. countries.  
Without resolving this difference, it is impossible for a U.S. 
aggregator to obtain financial data of their E.U. customers.  
Even transfer of E.U. employee information to the U.S. for 
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 From ZDNet UK news, “EU Rejects US Opposition to Privacy Directive”, 
5/8/2001, by Wendy McAuliffe. 
large U.S. based large financial internationals will be 
difficult. 
 
Policies for privacy protection on the Internet are still at an 
early stage.  The E.U. Privacy Directive has been scheduled 
for review by collecting experiences of member countries.  
Required by the GLBA, similar studies in the U.S. will be 
done by early 2002. These experiences will be helpful for us 
to understand the issues at hand and hopefully to arrive at 
appropriate level of privacy protection that can harmonize 
international differences.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Web aggregation is becoming a valuable service for 
increasingly more Internet users worldwide.  It collects 
existing data on the web and turns them into useful 
information that lowers search costs and simplifies online 
relationship management.  Meanwhile, it introduces some 
new risks to consumers, services providers, and other 
stakeholders.  As with any new IT capability, aggregation 
will be leveraged to minimize risks and bring more value to 
the society. 
 
Aggregation services are also raising a number of policy 
issues, primarily concerning the protection of databases and 
consumer privacy.  Both U.S. and E.U. have reacted to 
address these issues by instituting new policies such as 
GLBA privacy provisions and E.U. directives for database 
and privacy.  Differences among stakeholders still exist both 
domestically and internationally.  Although it may take a 
while to reconcile the differences and harmonize the 
discrepancies, consensus is being built toward an agreement 
of sufficient protection without jeopardizing the integrity of 
the Internet.  Aggregation will continue to thrive while we 
are achieving a harmonized policy regime for the 
information age.   
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